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Abstract
Purpose: We disentangle the relationship between the request of idiosyncratic deals (i-deals) and
the receipt of such deals, and investigate the moderating roles of human capital (gender and
industry experience) and social capital (LMX) in this relationship. Attitudinal outcomes of ideals receipt are also examined.
Design: Data were collected from 244 alumni of a Midwestern public university.
Findings: The positive relationship between i-deals request and receipt was stronger at higher
than at lower levels of LMX. Receiving i-deals was related positively to job satisfaction and
affective commitment, and negatively to turnover intention.
Research implications: We provide a nuanced perspective of i-deals by separating employees’
request from their receipt of i-deals, and identifying contingent factors that determine whether ideal requests are successful.
Practical implications: For employees, cultivating a strong relationship with one’s supervisor
can yield benefits that extend to i-deals negotiation. Providing i-deals to deserving workers can
boost employees’ work attitudes.
Originality/value: Previous studies have operationalized the i-deals construct as requesting and
receiving the deal, thereby excluding the possibility that employees may have requested but did
not receive the i-deal. This is one of the first studies to disentangle these two concepts, thereby
providing a more balanced and representative view of i-deal-making in organizations.
Keywords: idiosyncratic deals (i-deals); i-deals request; i-deals receipt; human capital; social
capital; leader-member exchange
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Introduction
Idiosyncratic deals (i-deals) are voluntary, personalized agreements of a nonstandard
nature, negotiated between employees and employers regarding terms that benefit each party
(Rousseau, Ho, & Greenberg, 2006). I-deals are increasingly used by employers to hire and
retain valued individuals (Rousseau, 2005). In turn, these employees report greater
organizational commitment (Ng & Feldman, 2010), work engagement (Hornung, Rousseau,
Glaser, Angerer, & Weigel, 2010), and citizenship behavior (Anand, Vidyarthi, Liden, &
Rousseau, 2010). Moreover, research has investigated the predictors of i-deals, including
organizations’ work structures, employees’ personal initiative, and the quality of leader-member
exchange (e.g., Hornung et al., 2010).
Despite these efforts, several issues in i-deals research need further investigation. One
pertains to the measurement of i-deals. Prior research notes that negotiation is a key element
underlying i-deal-making (Rousseau, 2005), involving separate processes of requesting and
receiving resources. However, studies have operationalized the i-deals construct as requesting
and receiving i-deals, thereby excluding the possibility that employees may request but not
receive i-deals, and implicitly assuming that the two occur jointly. This underscores the need to
differentiate i-deals request from receipt so as to understand the i-deal-making process. Further,
avoiding the confound of i-deals request and receipt is not only theoretically important but also
of practical value in providing guidance to employees and employers on how to manage the dealmaking process. Thus, our first objective is to examine the deal-making process by separating
request from receipt of i-deals. We focus on ex-post i-deals (i.e., i-deals negotiated after the
employee has joined the firm) as opportunities to negotiate i-deals, together with the spectrum of
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i-deals that one may negotiate for, are higher and more varied for ex-post i-deals than for those
negotiated during the hiring process (Rousseau et al., 2006).
Separating i-deals request from receipt also allows us to examine the conditions under
which employers grant a request. Negotiations research shows that people do not necessarily
receive what they want simply because they request it. Similarly, in the i-deals context,
employees may not receive what they request, and moderating conditions can enhance or
decrease employees’ likelihood of getting i-deals requests fulfilled. Because i-deals research has
yet to examine such conditions, we redress this by adopting a social exchange and power
perspective to investigate three moderating factors that each reflects a source of power or capital
employees may have, and contend that those with more capital are more likely to have their
requests fulfilled. While the social exchange perspective has dominated i-deals research and the
implicit role of worker power in i-deals negotiation has been alluded to (Rousseau, 2001),
scholars have yet to empirically investigate the sources of power that workers have in facilitating
their ability to have i-deals requests fulfilled. Thus, our research examines employees’ power in
relation to two other critical constituents in the i-deals making process: the organization that
ultimately confers i-deals and supervisors who typically negotiate i-deals with employees
(Greenberg, Roberge, Ho, & Rousseau, 2004).
The literature in human capital and social capital provides a coherent, systematic
foundation on which to map employees’ sources of power and capital. Human capital, reflecting
one’s skills and characteristics that contribute to productivity, is valued by organizations because
individual productivity enhances firms’ profits (Coleman, 1988), thereby representing a source
of employee power relative to the organization. Additionally, social capital, defined as aspects of
one’s social structure that create value and facilitate individual action (Coleman, 1988), captures
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individuals’ resources deriving from relationships (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998), and is
particularly suited to reflect one’s relationship with and power in relation to supervisors. Thus,
we depict human and social capital as representations of employees’ power in relation to the
organization and the supervisor respectively, and draw on social exchange and power-based
arguments to examine our second objective: how each of these sources of capital moderates the
relationship between i-deals request and receipt.
Finally, this study addresses the “so what?” question by linking i-deals to critical work
outcomes, namely job satisfaction, affective commitment, and turnover intention. While i-deals
research has examined the first two outcomes, we attempt to replicate prior findings to provide
strong evidence for meta-analytic studies. We also include a new outcome, turnover intention, to
demonstrate the reach of i-deals, especially given the proximal link between turnover intention
and actual turnover.
Theory Development and Hypotheses
Moderators in the I-Deals Request and Receipt Relationship: A Social Exchange and Power
Perspective
A social exchange perspective is suited for our study because the employment
relationship in which i-deals are negotiated represents a social exchange, defined as “a joint
activity of two or more actors in which each actor has something the other values” (Lawler,
2001, p. 322). Implicit in such exchanges is the value that each party can offer the other – the
greater the value, the more power that the incumbent has over the other. Consequently,
“exchange relations are simply subsets of power relations” (Baldwin, 1978, p. 1230), and
employees who possess resources that increase the employer’s dependence on them wield more
power and can more successfully negotiate for i-deals.
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Human capital, sometimes referred to as labor power or productive power of labor,
reflects a source of employee power in that those who possess such capital are more productive
and depended on by the organization to contribute to its functioning. The role of human capital
in facilitating i-deal negotiation has been recognized in i-deals theory, with Rousseau and
colleagues (2006) noting that human capital that is critical to the firm’s competitive position adds
to employees’ power when bargaining for i-deals. Social capital, on the other hand, derives not
from individuals’ personal characteristics but from their relationships with others, which can
nonetheless confer on them resources that facilitate action. Because both forms of capital
encompass resources that aid employees’ productive activity, they constitute sources of
employee power (where power is the ability to get things done). We next articulate how
representations of such capital moderate the relationship between i-deal request and receipt.
Human capital (Employee’s industry experience and gender). One conventional measure
of human capital is industry experience (Becker, 1975), capturing the length of time an
individual has worked in a specific industry or field. Individuals with such experience are likely
to accumulate general knowledge about the field as well as skills-based competencies, which
they can apply toward analyzing and solving work problems, thereby being more productive than
less experienced counterparts. Accordingly, they bring more value to the firm and are expected
to be more successful in having i-deals requests granted.
H1: The relationship between request and receipt of i-deals is more positive at higher
levels of industry experience.
Another individual attribute that confers status value in society is gender (Ridgeway,
1991), although this attribute has not been conventionally examined as a source of human
capital. Nonetheless, studies in labor economics, sociology, and other fields show that women,
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compared to men, are less likely to be promoted to leadership positions, receive lower starting
salaries, earn less when performing similar jobs in the same organization, and have less
advancement opportunities (e.g., Greig, 2008), because of gender stereotyping, gender
preferences, and organizational and structural constraints. These factors confer on men status and
power that may be implicit and covert, but nonetheless useful in enhancing their ability to get
things done. Thus, we expect that status by virtue of one’s gender represents another form of
power that extends to i-deals negotiations, such that women who ask for i-deals will be less
successful than men in getting their requests fulfilled.
Research on status beliefs about gender shows that people attach greater social
significance, competence, and skills to men than to women. While such gender stereotypes have
decreased and evaluations of women have improved over time, men are still evaluated as more
competent and productive, thereby possessing more power to successfully ask for i-deals. In
comparison, organizations tend to be reluctant to invest in women because of the assumption that
they have shorter and/or more intermittent work lives which diminish their productivity (Blau &
Kahn, 2007). Further, women who negotiate are seen as violating traditional gender status
hierarchy and expectations of feminine niceness, because negotiation is commonly associated
with a dominant, masculine image (Bowles, Babcock, & Lai, 2007). Women who negotiate for ideals may also be less successful because they possess less tactical knowledge of negotiations,
use fewer negotiation tactics than men, choose more indirect tactics, and are less able to match
the other party’s negotiation style (Stevens, Bavetta, & Gist, 1993). Thus, we propose the
following:
H2: The relationship between request and receipt of i-deals is more positive for men than
for women.
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Social capital (LMX relationship). We focus on employees’ social capital in reference to
their supervisors, given that they are typically the key agents who negotiate with employees on
the organization’s behalf (Greenberg et al., 2004). Further, supervisors have detailed knowledge
of employees’ contributions and deservingness to receive i-deals and the formal authority to
decide whether to grant i-deal requests. In the context of the supervisor-subordinate relationship,
leader-member exchange (LMX) has been advanced as a form of social capital between the two
parties (Uhl-Bien, Graen, & Scandura, 2000). LMX captures the degree of social exchange in the
supervisor-subordinate relationship, and employees with higher LMX are more trusted and
valued by the supervisor, with both parties enjoying greater loyalty, reciprocation, and support
from each other. Because high-LMX relationships take on a social exchange, employees in such
relationships can more easily access the supervisor who, in turn, is more inclined to give them
greater latitude over their work and respond more positively to their needs and demands. In
contrast, low-LMX relationships are characterized as transactional exchanges where both parties
fulfill their duties on a formally agreed, quid pro quo basis, often with a discrete, financiallyoriented focus (Shore, Tetrick, Lynch, & Barksdale, 2006). Consequently, employees who have
high-LMX relationships with their supervisors have been found to enjoy more i-deals than those
with low-LMX relationships (Hornung et al., 2010).
We expect that LMX will moderate the relationship between i-deals request and i-deals
receipt for three reasons. First, because high-LMX employees are valued by the supervisor, they
are perceived as deserving of individualized treatments. Second, social exchanges are
characterized by mutual investment in the relationship (Shore et al., 2006). Because granting ideals requests serves as a form of investment in subordinates, supervisors are more inclined to
make such investments in those with whom they have a social exchange relationship. Third,
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granting i-deals involves an element of risk in that employees may not subsequently reciprocate
such individualized treatment or may abuse it. However, the existence of a high-LMX
relationship, together with the trust that the supervisor has in the employee, serves to mitigate
this risk. Together, these reasons suggest LMX will enhance an employee’s success in getting ideals requests granted.
H3: The relationship between request and receipt of i-deals is more positive at higher
levels of LMX.
Attitudinal Outcomes
Granting employees’ i-deals is an organizational strategy to motivate employees to repay
the organization’s investment, such as by displaying positive work attitudes and behaviors. These
outcomes are explained using social exchange and reciprocity arguments, where the positive
attitudes and behaviors are outlets through which employees repay employers’ investment. We
not only attempt to replicate the relationships that i-deals receipt have with employees’ job
satisfaction and commitment, but also include turnover intention as an outcome. This is a natural
extension from prior findings in that employees who are happier with their jobs and feel greater
attachment to the organization would be less inclined to consider leaving the firm. Applying
similar arguments from social exchange theory, we expect that recipients of i-deals will feel a
sense of obligation to the firm and stay with it to reciprocate its investment in them (Gouldner,
1960).
We also expect that i-deals recipients are disinclined to leave the firm for self-serving
reasons. Individuals tend to be averse to options that are perceived as risky (Weber & Milliman,
1997), and leaving the current employer presents a risky move because while i-deals recipients
are assured of receiving an i-deal in the existing firm, it is uncertain that they will get a similar
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treatment at another firm. Research on status quo bias, demonstrating individuals’ preference for
the status quo because the disadvantages of leaving it loom larger than the advantages
(Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1991), also supports our contention. To the extent that the loss
of i-deals at the current firm is perceived as undesirable, i-deal recipients will be disinclined to
give up these i-deals for the potential gain they may have in another firm.
H4: Receipt of i-deals is positively related to (i) job satisfaction and (ii) affective
commitment, but negatively related to (iii) turnover intention.
Figure 1 summarizes the hypothesized relationships.
--------------------------------Insert Figure 1 about here
---------------------------------Method
Sample
Data for the study were collected from alumni who graduated from the undergraduate and
graduate programs of a Midwestern public university between 2001 and 2011. Using an online
survey, email requests (with a link to the survey) were sent to 6328 alumni, with 446 accessing
the survey. Of these, 244 (54.7%) respondents provided complete data.
While collecting data from a single source could introduce common method bias, this
data collection strategy is appropriate. First, since i-deals may be granted by different
organizational representatives (e.g., supervisor, human resource manager) and each may not be
fully cognizant of the i-deals an employee has received, using employee self-reports is
advantageous in obtaining complete information about the employee’s i-deals (Liao, Wayne, &
Rousseau, in press). Second, three of the four hypotheses pertain to moderating relationships;
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thus, common method variance (CMV) is not a significant threat (Siemsen, Roth, & Oliveira,
2010).
Majority of the respondents (54 percent) were male; 60 percent were White/Caucasian;
93 percent were employed; and 90 percent were full-time employees. The modal age group was
between 31 to 40 years old (44% of respondents), modal organizational tenure was between 2 to
5 years (39%), and modal annual income range was less than $60,000 (48%). The respondents
came from diverse industries, including accounting/finance, marketing and information
technology.
Measures
To measure i-deals, respondents were asked to think about items relating to four common
i-deals dimensions (developmental, flexibility, task, and financial i-deals). Developmental i-deals
relate to training and career development; flexibility i-deals refer to arrangements on the place
and time of work; task i-deals relate to one’s job content; and financial i-deals pertain to financial
compensation. The developmental i-deals scale (4 items) was adopted from Hornung et al.
(2008), and asked about training opportunities, skill development opportunities, on-the-job
activities, and career development opportunities. The flexibility i-deals scale (2 items) was taken
from the same source and referenced flexibility in starting and ending the workday, and
individually customized work schedules. Task i-deals scale (3 items) was adopted from Hornung
et al. (2010), and asked about personally challenging work tasks, special job duties or
assignments, and tasks that suit one’s personal interest. The financial i-deals scale (2 items) was
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developed for this study,1 and asked about (1) compensation (e.g., pay, bonuses); and (2) benefits
(e.g., health benefits; vacation time).
Respondents’ request for i-deals was measured with the question “After you started
working at your organization, how often did you ask for individual arrangements different from
your colleagues in terms of…” that referenced each of the i-deal items described above.
Respondents indicated their answers on a scale ranging from 1 (never) to 5 (always). For receipt
variables, respondents who did ask for i-deals were asked to indicate, on a scale ranging from 1
(not at all) to 5 (to a great extent), “to what extent did you successfully obtain the arrangements
in terms of …”, where each of the specific i-deal items was again specified.2 LMX was measured
with the 7-item scale developed by Scandura and Graen (1984) (e.g., “My working relationship
with my supervisor is extremely effective”). Gender was measured as 0 (female) and 1 (male).
Industry experience was measured as the number of years respondents have worked in their
specific industry.
Job satisfaction was assessed using Hackman and Oldham’s (1976) 4-item scale (e.g.,
“As a whole, I am satisfied with my job”). Affective commitment was assessed using Meyer and
Allen’s (1997) 6-item scale (e.g., “I would be very happy to spend the rest of my career in this
organization”). Turnover intention was assessed using Seashore and colleagues’ (1982) 3-item
scale (e.g., “I will actively look for a new job outside my organization in three months”). All
scales demonstrated good reliability.
We included demographic variables (age, race, and employment status) as controls in the
preliminary analyses, but because none of these was significantly related to the study variables,
1

The financial i-deals scale developed by Rosen and colleagues (2013) was not yet published at the time of data
collection, but their items are similar in assessing idiosyncrasies in pay, compensation plan, and compensation
arrangements.
2
As suggested by a reviewer, we also conducted the subsequent analyses using a dichotomized measure for receipt
variables; the results did not change substantially.

13
we excluded them from subsequent analyses so as to conserve statistical power. Because
participants answered questions relating to i-deals receipt only if they had made requests for such
items, those who did not make such requests had missing values on the corresponding receipt
variables. These missing values would have resulted in a significantly decreased sample size and
statistical power. Thus, we substituted the missing values in the receipt items with a value of 1
(“not at all” rating). Further, to account for the possibility that the substitution of these missing
data may skew the results, we created dummy-coded items based on the original receipt items,
such that those items that had missing data were recoded as 1 in the new dummy-coded variable,
and items without missing data were coded as 0. The relevant dummy-coded items for each ideal dimension were then averaged to create control variables reflecting the degree of missing
data substitution in the original receipt variables. This control variable [labeled receipt missing
data (MD)] was included in hypothesis-testing (see Figure 1).
To address common method bias, we included a scale that served as a marker variable.
Siemsen et al. (2010) recommended that marker variables should be theoretically unrelated to the
substantive variable but address some component of CMV. We developed a two-item
“sensitivity to others” scale (“I turn my back on others” and “I take no time for others”) as a
marker variable.
Results
Assessing Common Method Variance
In addition to using the marker variable to test for CMV, we addressed this threat by
including multiple predictor variables, which reduces the likelihood of CMV (Siemsen et al.,
2010). We followed Williams and colleagues’ (2010) confirmatory factor analysis (CFA)
approach with marker variable to assess method bias. Due to the large number of estimated
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parameters compared to the sample size, we conducted the CMV test for i-deals request and ideals receipt separately while adding the attitudinal outcomes and the marker variable in all
analyses. We used the four i-deals dimensions as indicators in the CMV test. The CFA approach
involved running a series of unconstrained and restricted models to detect the presence of CMV.3
Results showed non-significant differences between the baseline model and Method-C (Δχ2 =
0.26, Δdf = 1, p > .10 for i-deals request; Δχ2 = 0.66, Δdf = 1, p > .10 for i-deals receipt).
Moreover, there was no significant difference between Method-C and Method-R (Δχ2 = 0.00, Δdf
= 3, p > .10 for i-deals request; Δχ2 = 0.00, Δdf = 3, p > .10 for i-deals receipt). These results
provide strong evidence that CMV did not have any effect in the current study. Thus, we did not
include the marker variable in testing Hypothesis 4.
Hypotheses-Testing
We first conducted a series of CFAs to examine the factor structures of the request and
receipt variables. Results for i-deals request showed that the four-factor model had a good fit
with the data (Comparative Fit Index (CFI) = .955; Standardized Root Mean-Square Residual
(SRMR) = .046; Root Mean-Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) = .092) and was superior
to three-factor (combining developmental and task i-deals; Δχ2 = 131.20, Δdf = 1, p < .01), twofactor (combining developmental, flexibility, and task i-deals; Δχ2 = 317.67, Δdf = 3, p < .01),
and one-factor (combining all four i-deals into one factor; Δχ2 = 571.80, Δdf = 6, p < .01)
alternative models. We also tested a second-order factor of “I-deals Request”, and it had
comparable fit (CFI = .947; SRMR = .062; RMSEA = .097) to that of the four-factor model.
Although the four-factor model was statistically better than the second-order factor model (Δχ2 =

3

A full description of the models and procedures in CMV with CFA approach is provided in Williams et al. (2010).
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13.62, Δdf = 2, p < .01), we use the second-order factor for this study given that our focus is at
the second-order level.4
We also ran similar CFAs for i-deals receipt. The results showed that the four-factor
model had a good fit with the data (CFI = .941; SRMR = .055; RMSEA = .098). This model also
had superior fit to a three-factor model (Δχ2 = 119.10, Δdf = 1, p <.01), two-factor model (Δχ2 =
258.68, Δdf = 3, p < .01), and a one-factor model (Δχ2 = 368.89, Δdf = 6, p < .01). Moreover, a
second-order factor model also demonstrated good fit to the data (CFI = .938; SRMR = .058;
RMSEA = .098). Again, we retained the second-order factor model for i-deals receipt since it
was not statistically different from the four-factor model (Δχ2 = 6.59, Δdf = 2, p > .05) and was
consistent with our focus on the general construct of i-deals.
We also tested a two-factor model of i-deals where we treated the four dimensions of
request as indicators of an overall request factor, and the four dimensions of receipt as indicators
of a receipt factor.5 The results show that the two-factor model had excellent fit to the data (CFI
= .994; SRMR = .053; RMSEA = .042). Moreover, it had superior fit compared to a one-factor
model where all request and receipt dimensions loaded on one factor (Δχ2 = 231.34, Δdf = 1, p <
.01). Thus, we retained the two-factor model and created two variables corresponding to i-deals
request and receipt by taking the average of the corresponding four i-deals dimensions. The
descriptive statistics of the study variables are presented in Table 1.
To test the hypotheses, we conducted a path analysis by adding all direct and interactive
effects in one model. In view of prior research demonstrating the effect of LMX on employee
attitudes, we also included its direct effect on all three dependent variables. The model (see
Figure 2) fit the data well (CFI = .969; SRMR = .082; RMSEA = .059). For Hypothesis 1, the

4
5

We thank a reviewer for his/her suggestion.
The sample size was too small to conduct a full higher-order factor model for all request and receipt items.
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results in Figure 2 show that the interaction between industry experience and i-deals request was
not significant (β = -.04, p > .05). Thus, Hypothesis 1 was not supported. For Hypothesis 2, the
results in Figure 2 again reveal that the interaction between gender and i-deals request was not
significant (β = -.04, p > .05), failing to support hypothesis 2. For Hypothesis 3, the results
indicate a significant interaction between LMX and i-deals request (β = .17, p < .01). Figure 3
shows that the relationship between the request and receipt of i-deals was more positive at high
(+1 SD) LMX (b = .61, s.e. = .11, p < .01) than low LMX (-1 SD) (b = .36, s.e. = .09, p > .05).
Therefore, Hypothesis 3 was supported.
Figure 2 also presents the results for Hypothesis 4 on the outcomes of i-deals receipt. Ideals receipt was positively related to job satisfaction (β = .19, p < .05) and affective
commitment (β = .22, p < .01), and negatively related to turnover intention (β = -.23, p < .05),
thereby supporting Hypothesis 4.
--------------------------------Insert Table 1 and Figure 2 about here
---------------------------------Supplementary Analyses
To test whether these results will vary across different i-deal dimensions, we repeated the
analyses with individual dimensions. Industry experience was a moderator in the request-toreceipt link only for financial i-deals, and the interaction was contrary to the expected direction
in that the positive relationship was stronger for less experienced employees. Similarly, gender
was a moderator only for financial i-deals, such that the request-to-receipt link for this i-deal was
more positive for men than for women. Finally, LMX was a significant moderator for all i-deal
dimensions except financial i-deals, such that the request-to-receipt link was more positive when
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LMX was higher. As predictors, we found that all i-deal dimensions except flexibility i-deals
positively predicted job satisfaction and affective commitment, while only developmental and
task i-deals negatively predicted turnover intention.
Discussion
Research in i-deals has primarily focused on attitudinal and behavioral outcomes of
successful i-deal making, with fewer studies investigating factors contributing to successful ideal making. Further, prior research has not explicitly acknowledged that asking for i-deals may
not always translate into receiving such i-deals, nor examined contingent factors that enhance
employees’ success in getting requests fulfilled. Our study addresses this gap by isolating request
from receipt, and showing that not all requests are responded to positively; in fact, i-deals
request explained as little as 1% (developmental i-deals) and as much as 11% (financial i-deals)
in i-deals receipt. These results raise two significant issues. First, underscoring the complexities
in the i-deals negotiation process, the findings show that prior research capturing i-deals that
employees “asked for and successfully negotiated” may, in fact, provide only a partial picture of
i-deal-making. Second, the findings emphasize the need to explore factors that explain why some
(but not other) employees receive i-deals. Building on the capital-based perspective and social
exchange theory, we examined two explanatory factors relating to human capital and social
capital.
Human Capital as Moderators
The human capital perspective argues that individuals’ attributes play a role in their
success. While the path analyses revealed that industry experience did not moderate the link
between i-deals request and receipt when i-deals were examined as a whole, the supplementary
analyses showed that experience was a moderator for financial i-deals, but in a direction opposite
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to our prediction. While unexpected, this result suggests that less experienced employees are
more successful in getting their requests for financial i-deals granted, perhaps because they are
younger (as evidenced by a high correlation between age and experience; r =.76) and less
concerned about how their employment relationship ends. Consequently, employers are more
inclined to grant their financial i-deals request in order to retain them. However, given that this
finding was demonstrated only for financial i-deal, it should be interpreted with caution.
We also found that gender did not moderate the link between overall i-deals request and
receipt, but instead played a moderating role for financial i-deals, such that men were more likely
than women to get their financial i-deals requests fulfilled. Taken together, these findings
suggest that employers’ gender stereotypes and role orientation may apply only to more
economic- or financial-based i-deals, as such deals are more consistent with, and important to,
men’s gender roles. Thus, being a male provides a human capital advantage to employees
negotiating for financial i-deals, and to the extent that women’s requests for financial i-deals
violate employers’ gender stereotype and are perceived as inappropriately demanding, they are
less successful in obtaining such i-deals. The finding relating to the non-significant gender
differences for overall i-deals also suggests that women may be more selective in their requests
by asking only for i-deals that they know will be granted. Bowles and colleagues’ (2007)
experiment provides tangential evidence, in that women initiated negotiations only when they
anticipated little backlash from their request. Thus, given women’s selectivity in requesting for ideals that presumably do not violate gender stereotypes and status hierarchy, such requests may
be more likely to be granted. We offer this as a tentative explanation because we did not assess
employees’ anticipated backlash or gender stereotypes.
Social Capital as Moderator
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Our findings showed that LMX, a form of social capital, moderated the request-to-receipt
relationship for overall i-deals. Consistent with social exchange theory, supervisors may view
these deals as an investment in subordinates with whom they have high quality relationships, and
believe that they are more deserving of such deals and more likely to reciprocate such treatment.
However, our supplementary analyses indicate that LMX did not play a moderating role for
financial i-deals. One reason is that it may be easier for supervisors to justify why a valued
employee deserves other forms of i-deals than financial deals, given the economic and more
quantifiable nature of the latter. Further, the social exchange nature of high-LMX relationships is
inconsistent with the economic exchange nature of financial i-deals. The monetary resources
underlying financial i-deals are concrete and universal, and are characteristic of an economic
exchange relationship. In a high-LMX relationship, an employee’s request for such financial ideals runs counter to the social exchange nature of such relationship, and may in fact violate the
manager’s expectations of how a high-LMX employee should behave. A third reason could be
that factors other than one’s social capital with supervisors become more important when
negotiating for financial i-deals. For example, experience and gender were found to be key
moderators, and organizational factors such as budgetary issues may dominate when financial
resources are involved.
Outcomes of I-deals
The last objective was to examine the impact of i-deal receipt on work attitudes. While
receiving overall i-deals yielded positive attitudinal outcomes, a more nuanced pattern of results
was also revealed, in that flexibility i-deals did not predict these attitudes. While this contradicts
prior findings where flexibility i-deals enhanced employees’ organizational trust and voice and
decreased work-family conflict (e.g., Ng & Feldman, 2015), a possible explanation is that after
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joining the organization, employees may realize that flexibility i-deal is commonly provided to
employees, thereby decreasing the impact of this i-deal. Notwithstanding this, the results are
mostly consistent with social exchange theory, and extend previous studies by incorporating
turnover intention as an outcome.
Limitations and Future Research Directions
The current study is not without limitations. First, the study is based on employee recall,
and some of our results may be influenced by recall bias. However, recall bias may affect the
absolute extent or quantity reported but not the relative response pattern (Hornung, Rousseau, &
Glaser, 2009), and is unlikely to skew the strength of the observed relationships here. Second,
data were collected from a single source at one time period, introducing the risk of commonmethod bias. We mitigated this risk by focusing on and finding evidence for moderating
relationships, which cannot be attributed to such bias. While this bias could explain the
relationships between i-deals receipt and outcomes, the statistical remedies as well as the CMV
test reduced this risk. The fact that our results are consistent with prior studies adopting a
longitudinal approach further suggests that these results are not solely attributable to this bias.
Nonetheless, future research should adopt a longitudinal design and data from multiple sources
in order to make causal claims and rule out reverse causality.
Third, our study examined three moderators that represent employees’ human and social
capital. While we sought to include critical factors from each type of capital, these factors are not
fully representative of all forms of capital. Finally, while the moderation results lend support to
some hypotheses, our data preclude us from ruling out other explanations, such as respondents
with high-LMX relationships artificially inflating their reports of obtaining i-deals. However, the
fact that the moderating effects were not consistently found across all four i-deals dimensions
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suggests that these alternative effects are not systematic in nature. Notwithstanding, future
research should explore these and other alternative explanations, as well as other contextual
factors that may facilitate or hinder the request for and receipt of i-deals, and other forms of ideals.
Implications
This study offers important theoretical and practical implications. Theoretically, we
explicate the importance of distinguishing the request from receipt of i-deals, and provide a
nuanced perspective by separating these two aspects of the process and showing that prior
assumptions that these two occur jointly is not warranted. Second, we argue for and empirically
demonstrate the moderating role of worker power, specifically social capital (LMX), in
enhancing one’s ability to have i-deals request fulfilled. While i-deals theory has acknowledged
the role of power and interdependence in i-deals negotiation, the various bases of power that
employees possess in relation to the organization and their supervisor have not been documented
or explored. This study identified the role of LMX in determining whether employees’ i-deals
requests are ultimately successful, as well as the moderating roles of gender and industry
experience in the particular context of financial i-deals. Third, this study not only replicated
findings on the enhanced satisfaction and commitment resulting from i-deals, but is also the first
to examine turnover intentions as an outcome, underscoring the reach of i-deals.
This study also offers a different way to integrate social exchange theory with research in
human and social capital. Prior research combining these perspectives has predominantly
examined human and social capital as antecedents of individual success, using social exchangebased explanations on obligation, mutuality, and reciprocity to explicate how these sources of
individual capital translate into outcomes (e.g., Reiche, 2012). This study, on the other hand,
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emphasizes the notion of power and interdependence in social exchange to explain how human
and social capital can play moderating roles among parties embedded within an exchange
relationship. In particular, it recognized that negotiation is an integral aspect of such
relationships, and that one’s power relative to the other can enhance one’s ability to negotiate for
benefits. While the fundamental arguments of social exchange theory are the same here as in
prior studies, the different framing (individual capital as moderators rather than predictors) and
emphasis (power and dependence, rather than obligations and reciprocity) provides future
research with another way to integrate research in social exchange and human and social capital.
The study also offers practical implications. For organizations, the findings suggest that ideals can be an effective human resource management strategy, and providing i-deals to
deserving workers can boost their work attitudes and retain them. Further, the findings on the
moderating role of gender in relation to financial i-deals suggest the possibility of gender biases
and stereotypes at play. Thus, organizations should pay attention to the possibility of such biases
when distributing financial or economic rewards, and institute procedures to minimize the
differential treatment of employees based on gender. For employees, this study provides several
guidelines on i-deals negotiation. The findings on the moderating role of LMX suggest that
cultivating a strong relationship with one’s supervisor can yield benefits that extend to i-deals
negotiation, and LMX research offers multiple ideas for doing so, such as by displaying certain
characteristics (e.g., agreeableness) and enacting certain behaviors (e.g., ingratiation).
Additionally, to the extent that differences in gender and experience determine success in
receiving financial i-deals, the findings suggest that men and younger employees may be more
successful at negotiating for financial i-deals, but these advantages do not extend to other forms
of i-deals.
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Table 1
Descriptive Statistics, Correlations, and Reliabilities
No.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

Variables
Mean SD 1
2
3
Gender
.54 .50 Industry experience
10.85 8.13 -.07
LMX
3.54 .97 -.07 -.05 (.94)
I-deals receipt (MD)
.48 .37 -.10 .00 .00
I-deals request
2.15 .81 .02 -.04 - .04
I-deals receipt
2.10 .94 .05 .02 . 18*
Job satisfaction
3.48 .97 -.08 .02 .49**
Affective commitment 3.10 .82 -.06 -.04 .55**
Turnover intention
2.93 1.15 .05 .02 -.41**

4

(.84)
-.65**
-.74**
.04
.07
-.09

Note: Reliability coefficients are presented in the diagonals.
* p < .05; ** p < .01

5

(.75)
.66**
-.05
-.05
.04

6

7

(.74)
.17* (.91)
.14* .60**
-.12 -.56**

8

9

(.83)
-.65** (.72)
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I-deals receipt
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Figure 1. Hypothesized model.
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Gender

Industry
Experience

.01
-.04 -.04
I-deals request

LMX
.12

.04

*

Job Satisfaction
.19

I-deals receipt

.38**

-.53

**

I-deals receipt
(MD)

Figure 2. Results from path analyses.
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Figure 3. I-deals request and LMX interaction predicting i-deals receipt.

